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 Abstract 
The study of policy change has been receiving increasing scholarly attention. Despite the 
growing number of empirical studies on policy change, the definition and measurement of 
the concept has made limited progress. In comparative environmental policy research, for 
instance, most existing large n studies rely on impact data such as pollutant emissions to 
approximate processes of policy change, often without discussing the conceptual 
implications of this measurement approach. Against this background, this article proposes a 
new measurement concept for empirically assessing environmental policy change, which 
conceives of policy change in terms of changes in policy outputs. We illustrate our 
measurement concept on the basis of an original dataset covering the evolution of clean air 
policies in 24 advanced democracies over a period of almost three decades (1976-2003). In 
a second step, we evaluate the relationship between our measurement of environmental 
policy change and standard emission data representing the most widely used proxy in the 
literature. Our findings suggest that clean air policies cannot be consistently associated with 
emission levels, therefore calling into question the viability of environmental impact data for 
the study of the determinants of policy change. 
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I.  Introduction 
The analysis and explanation of what governments decide to do (or not to do) has always 
been at the heart of political science. This holds particularly true for the sub-discipline of 
public policy, given its focus on policy dynamics and the conditions facilitating or 
constraining. It is hence hardly surprising that there is an on-going debate about how to 
conceptualize and explain policy change (Baumgartner & Jones 1991; Radaelli 1997; 
Richardson 2000; John 2003; Capano & Howlett 2009; Howlett & Cashore 2009; 
Baumgartner et al. 2009; Howlett & Joshi-Koop 2011; Jacob & Jörgens 2011). At the same 
time, however, the predominant conceptual and theoretical focus on policy change comes 
along with limited attention paid to the question of how to empirically test the – partly quite 
complex – theoretical propositions. This is not to say that there is a lack of empirical 
assessments of policy change. However, empirical findings are rarely systematically 
interpreted in the light of existing theoretical and conceptual approaches. One of the most 
important deficits in this regard refers to the lacking critical reflection of the theoretical 
consequences that arise from the manner in which policy change is empirically assessed. 
This mismatch between theory and data used for their empirical test has been identified as 
an impediment to scientific progress in this field of inquiry (Howlett & Cashore 2009). 
These problems are particularly pronounced in the analysis of policy change in the 
environmental field. Especially large-n studies on environmental policy change are 
characterized by a discrepancy between the way in which they measure policy change and 
the factors they employ to provide for a theoretically informed explanation. While the 
theoretically-derived causes of policy change (e.g. the number of veto players, the policy 
positions of the government and legislature, problem pressure, or socio-economic 
conditions) are expected to affect governmental action and hence changes in environmental 
regulations, the measurement of change often relies on environmental impacts, for example, 
pollutant emissions or pollution levels. The measurement approach is typically inspired by 
the unavailability of direct measurements of governmental action. In short, theories 
accounting for change in policy outputs are tested by using data on policy impacts. It is either 
implicitly assumed that impact data constitute a valid proxy for policy outputs or that the 
theoretical causes of policy output change and policy impact change are more or less the 
same. This approach, however, entails the risk of producing misleading findings as policy 
impacts are usually affected by a plethora of confounding factors. 
It is the objective of this article to scrutinize this discrepancy between the measurement and 
the theoretical explanation of environmental policy change. To this end, we first develop an 
alternative approach to measuring environmental policy change, which differs from existing 
concepts insofar as it assesses policy change in terms of alterations in public law-making, 
i.e. policy outputs. Second, we test whether our measurement concept can be related to 
changes in environmental impacts as this represents a precondition for using the latter as a 
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proxy for changes in environmental policy outputs. Only if there is a robust causal 
relationship between the two measurements of environmental policy change, we can safely 
state that the proxies based on environmental impacts indeed provide a viable substitute for 
a direct measurement employing legislative outputs. 
Empirically, we focus on clean air policy, a prominent subfield in environmental policy 
research. In so doing, we use a new dataset compiled from changes in clean air regulations 
in 24 OECD countries over almost three decades
1
. Our results show that changes in clean 
air regulation cannot be systematically related to changes in pollutant emissions, hence 
questioning the validity of impact data as a proxy for testing theories of change in 
environmental policy outputs. More generally, our findings underline that more research 
efforts should be made in the collection of policy output data in order to advance our 
theoretical understanding of environmental policy change.  
This article proceeds as follows. We first discuss existing deficits pertaining to the analysis 
and measurement of environmental policy change. Subsequently, we introduce our 
alternative measurement concept of policy change. We finally proceed to the empirical 
analysis of clean air policy and provide a critical reflection of the results. 
                                                     
1
 The data were collected in the context of the collaborative project CONSENSUS (confronting Social and 
Environmental Sustainability with Economic Pressure). The project has been financed within the 7
th
 Framework 
Program of the European Commission. Generous research funding is gratefully acknowledged. For further details 
seehttp://www.polver.uni-konstanz.de/knill/forschung-projekte/confronting-social-and-environmental-sustainability-
with-economic-pressure-balancing-trade-offs-by-policy-dismantling-consensus/team/. 
I H S — Knill; Schulze; Tosun / Measuring environmental policy change— 9 
II.  Measuring environmental policy change: the dominance 
of impact data 
Many large-n comparative studies in environmental policy research have used changes in 
environmental impacts as proxies of environmental policy change (Young et al. 2008). The 
most frequently applied indicators are levels of environmental quality or aggregate data on 
pollutant emissions and degradation levels of certain environmental media, e.g. deforestation 
rates (see, e.g., Crepaz 1995; Murdoch 1997; Midlarsky 1998; Neumayer 2003; Wälti 2004; 
Van & Azomahou 2007; Perkins & Neumayer 2008). However, this choice is rarely 
theoretically motivated, but rather the result of data availability since impact data are 
regularly compiled and published by international organizations like the Organization for 
Economic Development and Co-operation (OECD) or the World Bank. 
What are the consequences of using impact data as indicators of policy change? Basically, 
there is a potential validity problem because intervening variables cannot sufficiently be 
controlled for. Even though there should, in principle, be a connection between the actual 
decisions taken by governments (i.e. policy outputs) and changes in environmental quality 
(i.e. policy impacts), this relationship might be influenced by a multitude of additional 
variables (see, e.g. Neumayer 2002). It is thus a demanding task to extract the net effect of 
governmental decision on changes in environmental quality by using control variables. The 
level of carbon dioxide emissions in a country, for instance, may not only depend on 
economic up- and downturns – a popular control variable – but also on a range of additional 
structural variables, such as investments in energy efficiency, shifts to more or less energy-
intensive final goods, or the use of different fossil fuels and renewable energies (see, e.g., 
Aubourg et al. 2008). 
The same objection with regard to confounding factors can be made against environmental 
performance indices that are sometimes used in large-n studies (see, e.g., Jahn 1998; 
Scruggs 1999, 2002; Esty & Porter 2005; Roller 2005). Although constructing indices is a 
means to overcome problems emerging from a too narrow conception of the dependent 
variable, it does not necessarily result in a valid measurement of policy change. Rather, the 
number of confounding factors may rise with the number of environmental impact indicators 
included in the index, hence further aggravating the ‗dependent variable problem‘ (Howlett & 
Cashore 2009) in the study of environmental policy change.  
The above discussion has shown that environmental impacts are quite distant proxies of 
governmental decisions. For analysts interested in examining and explaining changes in 
environmental policy-making, the use of impact data therefore poses serious problems of 
validity, which are only rarely reflected in the literature (for notable exceptions, see 
Neumayer 2002; Andonova et al 2007). 
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A further and also hardly acknowledged problem with the use of impact data in comparative 
environmental policy research refers to their limited reliability. Usually, the generation of this 
data is based on national reporting whose measurement procedures and data quality are 
largely unknown to social scientists. For example, there are no common principles for the 
production of emission data from industrial sites at the international level (Saarinen 2003; 
see also Styles et al. 2009). Moreover, these measurement procedures are frequently 
subject to changes that go unnoticed.  
A final problem with environmental impact data relates to time-lags between governmental 
action and potential policy effects. It is hardly impossible to exactly determine how much time 
has to pass until, for instance, new emission standards result in lower or higher levels of 
pollution. Even though time-series analyses often use lagged explanatory variables, usually 
by one year, the exact quantification of these intervals rests constitutes an arbitrary choice 
rather than resting on a sound scientific calculation.   
In the light of these potential problems, it is striking that many environmental policy studies, 
in particular macro-quantitative ones, use impact data rather uncritically to order to examine 
theories that refer to policy output change and the behaviour of political actors. However, as 
long as systematic reflections on restrictions regarding the measurement of the dependent 
variable are not made explicit, it is difficult to assess the explanatory power, comparability, 
and reliability of different research results. 
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III.  Alternative concepts of policy change 
Which alternatives exist to more convincingly approach policy change conceptually and 
methodologically? What are the advantages and disadvantages? This section tackles these 
questions. The conceptual and analytical ideas that are developed here are based on three 
considerations. Firstly, policy change should be measured more directly on the basis of 
policy outputs, i.e. governmental regulatory activity. Secondly, policy output measures should 
be generally conceptualized to capture events of policy change in a more detailed manner 
and to avoid focussing on single policies or policy instruments. Thirdly, concepts of policy 
change should allow for accurately assessing developments in both directions, i.e. policy 
expansion and dismantling. 
 
III.1  Environmental policy change as change in policy output 
In contrast to impact data, the assessment of policy outputs allows for the detailed and 
multidimensional assessment of political decisions and their changes over time. Policy 
outputs can, for instance, refer to basic principles or paradigms of political programmes, the 
chosen policy instruments, or the concrete settings of these instruments (Hall 1993). 
Environmental impact data, by contrast, cannot capture such complex structures of policy 
change. For example, emission data do not entail information about how, i.e. by means of 
which policy instruments or their precise calibrations, certain pollution levels have been 
achieved (Jordan et al. 2005). This is a serious limitation because the choice of an 
environmental policy instrument as such already represents a crucial political decision and 
significant trade-offs can arise in the choice of instruments (Goulder & Parry 2008). 
Comprehensive assessments of changes in different dimensions of environmental policy 
output are predominantly provided by small-n studies (see, e.g., Hoberg 1991; Urwin & 
Jordan 2008; Kochtcheeva 2009; Mazmanian & Kraft 2009). In contrast, the few existing 
large-n studies analysing environmental policy outputs either concentrate on the diffusion of 
certain policy innovations, e.g. environmental impact assessments (Hironaka 2002) or new 
types of policy instruments (Tews et al. 2003), or on concrete regulatory settings, e.g. the 
maximum allowed lead content in gasoline (Fredriksson et al. 2005). By focussing on single 
policies or policy dimensions, however, these studies adopt a selective perspective on policy 
change which might lead to biased conclusions regarding the degree of change (see also 
Meseguer & Gilardi 2009). To date, there are hardly any studies of environmental policy 
change that equally deal with different environmental policies, instruments, and their 
concrete settings (for an exception, see Holzinger et al. 2008a, 2008b). 
Closely related to the dominant focus on environmental innovations is the fact that change is 
typically defined as a departure from the status quo without considering the direction of 
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change. This way, it is neglected that change is not unidirectional, but can go into two 
directions, i.e. expansion and dismantling. For example, the introduction of environmental 
taxes can be interpreted as expansion, while their abolishment would imply dismantling (Knill 
et al. 2009). Moreover, expansion and dismantling activities can differ across the dimensions 
under study. For instance, it is possible that states introduce a variety of new policy 
instruments, while, at the same time, lowering regulatory levels of existing instruments, e.g. 
the strictness of emission standards. 
How can we capture policy change in both its complexity and its innate direction on the basis 
of policy outputs? In the following, we propose a measurement concept based on a partially 
modified version of Peter Hall‘s typology of policy change (Hall 1993). On a first, very basic 
level it is analyzed whether a policy for specific target, e.g. the quality of drinking water, is in 
place. The second category relates to the instruments used to realize the respective policy 
goals, e.g. emission standards or environmental taxes. The third, most narrowly specified, 
category of policy change corresponds to the concrete setting or calibration of the applied 
instruments, including the level of, for instance, emission limits, and their scope of 
application, that is, the individuals, organizations, or activities targeted by a specific 
instrument. 
This way, our concept goes beyond the typology put forward by Hall as it additionally 
includes the scope-dimension. Moreover, the way in which we apply the measurement 
concept allows for a more nuanced empirical assessment of environmental policy change, 
since in contrast to Hall we do not limit ourselves to only pointing out instances of major or 
minor policy change, but characterize each event in the most comprehensive manner. Table 
1 illustrates how policy expansion and policy dismantling can be measured along these three 
categories. 
Table 1: The measurement of policy expansion and dismantling. 
Category Policy Expansion Policy Dismantling 
 
Policy presence 
 
Introduction or addition of a 
new policy 
 
 
Dismantling of an existing 
policy 
 
Policy instruments 
 
The number of policy 
instruments increases, e.g. 
information-based 
instruments are adopted  
 
 
The number of instruments 
decreases, e.g. market-
based instruments are 
abolished   
 
Policy calibration:  
Instrument levels and 
scopes 
 
Tightening regulatory 
standards or increasing the 
target group, e.g. by lowering 
emission limits 
 
 
Loosening regulatory 
standards or decreasing the 
target group, e.g. by 
increasing emission limits  
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Following these categories, it is possible to give a detailed assessment of policy change. In 
order to avoid a selective perspective on policy change, we advocate assessing policy 
change in terms aggregate developments comprising all changes in state activity within a 
policy field. This perspective can be realized by classifying and counting all events of change 
according to the aforementioned categories. 
Moreover, we are able to identify the direction of each event of change. For example, 
expansion in terms of policy presence takes place if a new pollutant becomes subject to 
regulatory activity. Dismantling, by contrast, would occur if a given pollutant is not regulated 
anymore. The number of policy instruments increases if a new measure to curb emissions of 
a certain pollutant, e.g. a tax, is introduced and decreases if a measure is abolished. Policy-
makers can also increase or decrease the concrete calibration of policy instruments. For 
example, the specific levels of a tax as well as the target group of a tax can be either 
increased or decreased. We count the first case as an event of expansion and the latter as 
an event of dismantling. 
 
III.2  Density and intensity of policy change 
Even when relying on the analytical categories of policy presence, policy instruments, and 
policy calibration, we still have to clarify how to aggregate the magnitude and direction of 
changes in a given policy field. When do we speak of policy expansion and when of policy 
dismantling? How do we assess the degree of potential changes in one or the other 
direction? 
For this purpose, we distinguish between two basic dimensions, namely ‗policy density‘ and 
‗policy intensity‘. The dimension of policy density describes indicates the degree of legislative 
penetration and internal differentiation of a policy field. It hence explores the number of 
policies or instruments used within a policy field, and how this number changes over time. In 
a complementary vein, policy intensity aims at measuring the stringency of the adopted 
measures. This second dimension includes regulatory standards, such as emission limits, 
but also the scope of application of these regulations, i.e. those affected, such as specific 
industry branches.  
The concepts of policy density and policy intensity thus complement one another in their 
assessment of policy change. In this regard, it is important to note that a densely regulated 
policy field does not automatically require that the respective legal provisions are very strict 
or far-reaching and vice versa. Nevertheless, depending on the maturity of the policy field, 
changes in policy density may be accompanied by changes in intensity. A development along 
this pattern is likely for policy fields in their early stages of development. In such a 
constellation, any new legislation will not only increase the density of the field, but might also 
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increase policy intensity, assuming that the status quo was characterized by the absence of 
any governmental activities with regard to the policy item in question. 
For more established policy fields, by contrast, this linkage is less likely. It is rather 
conceivable that increases in density are accompanied by decreases in intensity and vice 
versa. Such trade-offs might occur, for instance, if a country is obliged by international law to 
introduce new legislation and seeks to compensate negatively affected domestic actors (e.g. 
private companies) by reducing other regulatory burdens in the policy area.  
Table 2 summarizes the proposed dimensions and sub-dimensions of policy change and 
attaches a set of indicators to them. The latter are only broadly introduced at this point, as 
they have to be operationalized more specifically in the relevant research context. In section 
four, we introduce the specific operationalization for the example of clean air policy. 
Table 2: Dimensions and indicators of policy change 
Dimension  Indicators 
 
Policy density 
 
Policy target density 
 
Development of policies over time 
(Difference between number of adopted and 
abolished policies) 
 Policy instrument 
density 
Development of instruments over time 
(Difference between number of adopted and 
abolished instruments) 
 
 
Policy intensity 
 
Intensity level 
 
Development of policy instrument strictness 
over time 
(Difference between number and/ or degree 
measures with increasing and decreasing 
effects) 
 Intensity scope Development of personal scope / 
substantive scope / temporal scope of a 
policy instrument over time 
(Difference between number and/ or degree 
measures with increasing and decreasing 
effects) 
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III.2.1 Conceptualizing policy change as change in policy density 
Broadly speaking, an increase in policy density points towards policy expansion, whereas a 
decrease in policy density can be interpreted as policy dismantling. Changes in policy 
density can be measured via two indicators – the number of policy targets and the number of 
policy instruments within a policy field. It generally holds that the larger the number of policy 
targets, the higher is the regulatory penetration of a policy field. For example, in order to 
reduce air pollution, governments can define a plethora of regulatory goals. On the one 
hand, they can regulate the amount of pollutant emissions. The corresponding policy targets 
would then refer to the regulation of emissions of different substances. On the other hand, 
governments can also adopt policies that define specific air quality goals with regard to 
various substances, e.g. particulate matter (see, e.g. Jordan et al. 2010). If the number of 
regulatory issues, i.e. policy targets or items, in a policy field increases, it indicates policy 
expansion, whereas policy dismantling becomes manifest in a decrease of the number of 
policy targets.   
The second indicator for measuring policy density is determined by the number of policy 
instruments in a given policy field. The number of policy instruments measures policy density 
on a more concrete level than the number of policy targets. A change in the number of 
instruments, however, does not necessarily coincide with a change in the number of policy 
targets. To reduce the amount of industrial carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions into the air, for 
instance, governments can rely upon a broad array and combination of instruments, 
including command-and-control approaches (the definition of legally-binding emission 
standards), economic incentives (such as environmental taxes or emission trading systems), 
or industrial self-regulation and voluntary agreements (see, e.g., Sterner 2002). Even if the 
number of policy targets in a given policy area remains constant over time, the number of 
policy instruments can hence increase or decrease.  
In sum, expansion in the dimension of policy density is measured by any increase in the 
number of policies and instruments, whereas any decrease means policy dismantling. In 
other words, we measure the extent to which policy density expansion occurs by the addition 
of new policies or policy instruments and policy density dismantling by the abolishment of 
existing ones. 
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III.2.2 Conceptualizing policy change as change in policy intensity 
The dimension of policy intensity captures changes in the stringency of governmental 
intervention in a policy field. An increase in intensity over time can accordingly be understood 
as policy expansion, whereas a decrease indicates policy dismantling. We measure changes 
in policy intensity by two indicators: the intensity level and the intensity scope. First, changes 
in policy intensity rest upon potential increases or reductions of regulatory standards such as 
the concrete level of permissible emissions. Second, changes in policy intensity refer to the 
scope of application of policy instruments. The intensity scope increases in conjunction with 
the number of cases, constellations, or addressees covered by a certain policy instrument. 
For instance, the scope of an emission standard regulating certain emissions from 
combustion plants increases once the threshold defining the size of plants covered by the 
regulation is lowered. In this case, more companies would be covered by the emission 
standard and would therefore have to comply with the respective legal obligations.  
The dimensions of policy density and intensity are useful for studying aggregate changes in 
policy output with considerable attention to detail. In particular, they allow examining 
regulatory changes over entire policy fields. They are, naturally, less useful if the researcher 
is interested in studying regulatory shifts with respect to particular types of policy 
instruments, for example a shift from command-and-control instruments to economic 
incentives. 
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IV.  Operationalizing changes in policy density and 
intensity: the case of clean air policy 
How can the proposed measurement concept be applied in practical research? This section 
answers this question by demonstrating a specific operationalization of changes in policy 
density and intensity based on policy outputs for the case of clean air policy. Our 
operationalization is guided by the main purpose of testing whether environmental policy 
outputs can be empirically related to environmental impacts. As discussed, most studies in 
the field that employ theories of policy change to explain environmental impacts assume that 
there is a direct relationship between them (see, e.g., Wälti 2004; Bernauer & Koubi 2009). 
But does this assumption bear an empirical test based on our measurement of policy 
change?   
For this purpose, the operationalization should, above all, allow for an encompassing 
measurement and comparison of developments in clean air policy-making across countries 
and over time. We measure clean air policy change as an aggregate count of all events of 
change in policy output coded according to the proposed measurement concept. In total, we 
study changes in clean air policy outputs in 24 OECD countries from 1976 to 2003 which 
have been compiled by the CONSENSUS project
2
.  
To begin with, table 3 lists all policy targets considered to comprehensively assess changes 
in clean air policy. Overall, twenty policy targets are examined that refer to both air quality 
and pollutant emissions as well as product standards. If one of the listed items becomes 
subject to regulatory intervention, we count it as one event of policy expansion. Conversely, 
if one of the items is not regulated anymore, we count this as an event of policy dismantling. 
 
  
                                                     
2
 For more detailed information visit http://www.polver.uni-konstanz.de/knill/forschung-projekte/confronting-social-
and-environmental-sustainability-with-economic-pressure-balancing-trade-offs-by-policy-dismantling-
consensus/team/. 
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Table 3: Clean air policy targets 
Air quality 
1. Air quality standards for nitrogen oxides (NOx) 
2. Air quality standards for sulphur dioxide (SO2) 
3. Air quality standard for carbon monoxide (CO) 
4. Air quality standard for particulate matter 
5. Air quality standard for ozone (O3) 
6. 
 
Air quality standard for lead 
 
Emissions (from stationary or mobile sources, product standards) 
7. Nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions from large combustion plants using coal 
8. Nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions from passenger vehicles using unleaded gasoline 
9. Nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions from heavy duty vehicles using diesel 
10. Sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions from large combustion plants using coal 
11. Sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions from passenger vehicles using unleaded gasoline 
12. Sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions from heavy duty vehicles using diesel 
13. Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from large combustion plants using coal 
14. Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from passenger vehicles using unleaded gasoline 
15. Carbon monoxide (CO) emissions from large combustion using coal 
16. Carbon monoxide (CO) emissions from passenger vehicles using unleaded gasoline 
17. Particulate matter emissions from large combustion plants using coal 
18. Arsenic emissions from stationary sources 
19. Maximum permissible limit for the lead content of gasoline 
20. Maximum permissible limit for the sulphur content of diesel 
 
Second, we consider every instrument that is used to achieve the underlying regulatory 
objective of each of the specified policy targets. The types of instruments examined are 
listed in table 4. Note that there can be several instruments of the same type, e.g. several 
technological prescriptions, in place to regulate a given policy target. Again, the introduction 
of a new instrument counts as an event of policy expansion whereas the abolishment of an 
existing instrument counts as an event of dismantling. 
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Table 4: Environmental policy instruments 
Instrument Description 
Obligatory standard A legally enforceable numerical standard, typically involving a 
measurement unit, e.g. mg/l 
Prohibition / ban A total or partial prohibition/ban on certain emissions, 
activities, products etc.  
Technological 
prescription 
A measure prescribing the use of a specific technology or 
process 
Tax / levy A tax or levy for a polluting product or activity 
Subsidy / tax reduction A measure by which the state grants a financial advantage to 
a certain product or activity 
Liability scheme A measure that allocates the costs of environmental damage 
to those who have caused the damage 
Planning instrument A measure defining areas or times that deserve particular 
protection 
Public investment A specific public investment  
Data collection/ 
monitoring programmes 
A specific programme for collecting data 
Information-based 
instrument 
Exchange of information between the state and polluters or 
among polluters 
Voluntary instrument Voluntary agreements or commitments between the state and 
private actors or among private actors 
Permits A permit to pollute the environment or to 
produce/import/export/sell environmentally harmful products 
 
Finally, we count every change in the strictness and scope of an instrument as an event of 
either policy expansion or dismantling. Another possibility would have been to precisely 
quantify the changes in level and scope. We do not pursue this approach, however, because 
it is very difficult to make these changes comparable across policy instrument and countries 
over time. For example, we cannot readily compare the levels of taxes with those of 
emission standards. Another problem is represented by the fact that some jurisdictions prefer 
defining specific standards for individual industry sectors whilst others prefer to define 
universal standards that are uniformly valid for all industry sectors. We thus deem it 
conceptually more appropriate to adhere to an aggregate count of all events of change with 
expansive and dismantling effects. From this it follows that the final measure of aggregate 
policy change is composed of the difference between all expansive and dismantling events 
of change (see table 1). Density change consists of all changes in policy targets and 
instruments and intensity change is measured in terms of changes in levels and scopes.  
Figure 1 illustrates clean air policy changes aggregated over all countries in our sample. The 
dashed line denotes the count of all events of policy expansion, whereas the solid line gives 
the count of dismantling events. The continuously rising graphs represent our principal 
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measures of clean air policy density and intensity, i.e. cumulative change (expansion minus 
dismantling) over time. Dismantling activities in clean air policy-making do indeed exist for 
our country sample but are overall rather the exception. This leads to a continuous increase 
in overall policy density and intensity, i.e. policy expansion discounted of dismantling. 
Moreover, both expansive and dismantling activities in terms of clean air policy intensity are 
more frequent than density changes (see, Hall 1993). They also increase towards the end of 
our observational period, suggesting that policy-makers focus increasingly on the intensity 
dimension as policy fields grow more mature. 
Figure 1: Clean air policy change in 24 OECD countries. 
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V.  Explaining air pollutant emissions by clean air policies 
This section finally examines whether environmental policy output can help to explain 
environmental impacts. In fact, this is the implicit, and hardly tested, assumption made by 
studies that use theories of policy change to explain changes in environmental impacts. 
Empirically, we focus on clean air policy, and in particular whether clean air policies in terms 
of output can be related to emission levels of pollutants. 
 
V.1  Introducing the variables 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
CO2 CO2 emission intensity (grams of 
emission per unit GDP, log) 
17.839 .415 16.691 18.600 
SO2  SO2 emission intensity (grams of 
emission per unit GDP, log) 
12.369 .999 9.631 13.947 
NOX NOX emission intensity (grams of 
emission per unit GDP, log) 
12.243 .611 10.564 13.913 
Policy density Clean air policy density 19.875 18.672 0 88 
Policy 
intensity 
Clean air policy intensity 21.590 23.019 0 114 
GDP pc GDP per capita (2000 US$, log) 9.627 .595 7.794 10.559 
GDP growth Annual GDP growth 2.930 2.599 -6.854 11.494 
Population 
density 
Population density (people per 
sqkm of land area) 
133.978 132.285 1.826 494.411 
Urban 
population 
Urban population (% of total 
population) 
71.802 11.921 41.2 97.22 
Industry Industrial added value (% of total 
GDP) 
31.768 4.867 19.034 42.623 
Trade intensity Imports + exports (% of GDP) 60.607 29.224 9.102 184.742 
Manufactures 
exports 
Manufactures exports (% of 
merchandise exports) 
68.321 21.785 9.361 96.558 
Manufactures 
imports 
Manufactures imports (% of 
merchandise imports) 
68.932 12.437 18.315 87.438 
FDI inflow Foreign direct investment net 
inflows (% of GDP) 
2.017 5.073 -.663 92.498 
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Our dependent variables are national emission intensities, i.e. emissions in grams per unit of 
GDP (see, Cao & Prakash 2010), of three frequently used air pollutants, namely CO2, 
sulphur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOX). The emission data were gathered from the 
Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR)
3
. A summary of all key 
variables is presented in table 5. 
To begin with, our core explanatory variables refer to the effect of regulatory activity 
measured in terms of clean air policy density (Policy density) and intensity (Policy intensity) 
as introduced earlier. In general, we expect emission intensities to decrease with more 
dense and more intense clean air regulations and vice versa. Since the two dimensions are 
highly correlated for clean air policy, we build separate models around them.  
We test the effect of clean air regulations on emission intensities against several control 
variables. First, following the reasoning of the so-called environmental Kuznets curve, 
demand and supply of environmental policies are expected increase at higher income levels, 
which might finally also lead to lower emissions (see, e.g., Selden & Song 1994; Grossman 
& Krueger 1995; Aubourg et al. 2008). Moreover, economic downturns can be responsible 
for reductions in pollution loads (Hughes & Lovei 1999). Contrary to this expectation, 
however, economic upswings can also boost investment in more advanced and 
environmentally friendly technologies. We control for these factors by including the natural 
log of GDP per capita (GDP pc) and the growth rate of GDP in our models (GDP growth). 
Apart from these general economic conditions, the structural composition of national 
economies should have an impact on emission levels. In particular, the industrial sector can 
be expected to contribute above average to overall pollution (see, e.g. Earnhart & Lizal 
2008). We therefore control for the size of the industrial sector via its contribution to total 
GDP (Industry). 
Another set of controls refers to the effects of international trade. First, we control for 
differences in overall trade intensity, measured as exports plus import as a percentage of 
GDP. Higher levels of trade can be assumed to either exert downward pressures on 
environmental standards (Prakash & Potoski 2006) or induce convergence towards higher 
levels of environmental standards (Vogel 1995). We also use two more specific controls that 
capture effects emanating from differential patterns of international trade, namely the share 
of manufactures exports and manufactures imports. Since the production of manufactured 
goods is known to be particularly pollution intense, the standard theory of regulatory 
competition would predict laxer regulation and hence higher emission intensities, particularly 
for countries that rely more heavily on manufacture exports. The alternative scenario, 
however, is that increased competition from manufacture imports and exports has positive 
effects if domestic firms move towards more environmentally efficient product and production 
technologies (Perkins & Neumayer 2008). By the same token, beneficial technology 
                                                     
3
 Available at: http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 
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spillovers can be expected at higher levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. We 
therefore also include net FDI inflow in our model. 
Finally, in accordance with previous studies, we control for population density and urban 
population in order to rule out confounding effects related to demographics. All independent 
variables, except for our output measures, are derived from the World Bank‘s World 
Development Indicators. 
 
V.2  Discussion of main findings 
We estimate the relationship between emission intensities and the discussed explanatory 
variables by means of standard panel analysis techniques. As customary in the literature, all 
explanatory variables are lagged one year. We include country fixed-effects in our analyses 
because we are interested in the effects of changes in environmental policy output on 
environmental impacts rather than in the effects of country-differences in regulatory levels. 
This way, we are also able to control for unobserved country-level heterogeneity and to 
ensure that the results are not driven by particular countries (Kittel & Winner 2005). In our 
first set of models, reported in table 5, we use panel-corrected standard errors with 
corrections for first-order autocorrelation to correct for disturbances arising from cross-
sectional heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation, and temporal autocorrelation 
(Beck & Katz 1995). We first do not include a lagged dependent variable as it is likely to 
absorb any trend in our dependent variables (Plümper et al. 2005). 
Our first findings show that policy outputs have overall a significant negative effect on 
emission intensities. In other words, higher levels of clean air policy density and intensity are 
associated lower levels of emission intensities, suggesting that a positive effect of 
environmental regulatory efforts exists in the countries under study. Only in the case of CO2 
emissions, the coefficient for policy density does not reach statistical significance. 
As regards the control variables, our results confirm most of the discussed expectations 
based on previous research. While emission intensities for all three pollutants decrease at 
higher levels of per capita income in a country, periods of strong economic growth increase 
emission intensities for CO2 and SO2. Moreover, as expected, higher shares of value added 
by industrial production significantly increase emission intensities, at least in five out of six 
models. Urbanization also has a significant positive effect on emissions, whereas increases 
in population density turn out as a significant negative predictor of SO2 emissions only. 
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Table 6: Determinants of air emissions, 1976-2003. Specification in levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CO2 CO2 SO2 SO2 NOX NOX 
       Policy density -0.0002  -0.0029**  -0.0017**  
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Policy intensity  -0.0012***  -0.0055***  -0.0030*** 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
GDP pc -0.7360*** -0.6844*** -1.7159*** -1.5500*** -1.1387*** -1.0507*** 
 (0.064) (0.063) (0.164) (0.165) (0.115) (0.115) 
GDP growth 0.0021* 0.0019* 0.0052** 0.0044* 0.0018 0.0014 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Population density -0.0019 -0.0017 -0.0109*** -0.0101*** -0.0033 -0.0029 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Urban population 0.0261*** 0.0250*** 0.0446*** 0.0406*** 0.0388*** 0.0362*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) 
Industry 0.0040** 0.0026 0.0337*** 0.0290*** 0.0128*** 0.0102*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
Trade intensity -0.0015** -0.0013** -0.0054*** -0.0047*** -0.0025** -0.0021** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Manufactures exports 0.0007 0.0007 0.0025 0.0025 -0.0013 -0.0013 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Manufactures imports -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0044** -0.0038* -0.0005 -0.0003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
FDI inflow 0.0004 0.0006 -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Constant 23.3096*** 22.9283*** 25.8002*** 24.6267*** 20.9237*** 20.3431*** 
 (0.555) (0.566) (1.362) (1.434) (1.045) (1.021) 
R
2
 0.999 0.999 0.987 0.987 0.995 0.995 
N/Countries 632/24 632/24 632/24 632/24 632/24 632/24 
       Notes:  Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients for country fixed-effects are not reported. All independent variables lagged one 
year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Interestingly enough, higher levels of overall trade are associated with lower emission 
intensities for all three pollutants. At the same time, levels of FDI inflow cannot be associated 
with emission intensities. Together, these findings counter the pollution haven scenario and 
rather point to a beneficial effect of economic integration on environmental quality, at least 
among OECD countries. With regard to the more specific characteristics of trade in our 
models, we can only find a significant reduction in SO2 emissions at higher levels of 
manufactures imports, whereas exports of manufactures do not seem to have a systematic 
effect on emission intensities. In accordance with previous research, this finding could be 
explained by environmental efficiency enhancing technology and knowledge spillovers, 
which should be particularly high for imports of advanced capital goods (Perkins & 
Neumayer 2008). 
We next check the robustness of our findings by including a lagged dependent variable, 
which is the widely used alternative to deal with serial correlation and to model dynamic 
processes. By including a lagged dependent variable, we effectively assume that current 
emission levels can be explained by emission levels in the previous period. Beck and Katz 
(2011: 342) also recommend this procedure for fixed-effects specifications, since it 
outperforms instrumental variable approaches in time-series with more than twenty periods. 
The results reported in table 7 show that policy density and intensity do not turn out as 
significant predictors of emission intensity levels. Instead, our findings suggest that the 
yearly adjustments in emission intensities modelled by the lagged dependent variable 
approach can best be explained by per capita income and urbanization. More specifically, 
increases in per capita income lead to lower emission levels of CO2 and NOX, whereas 
urbanization leads to increases in these emissions. As regards SO2 emissions, the 
coefficients for both variables are not significant. Moreover, increasing shares of industrial 
production increase emission levels of SO2 and NOX, but not CO2. The results also 
moderately support that increasing trade volumes tend to limit CO2 and SO2 emissions. 
Overall, our lagged dependent variable models cast first doubts on the causal relationship 
between changes in clean air policies and air pollutant emissions. In particular, periodical 
adjustments in emission intensities do not seem to follow directly from changes in regulatory 
activity. 
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Table 7: Determinants of air emissions, 1976-2003. Specification in levels including a lagged dependent variable. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CO2 CO2 SO2 SO2 NOX NOX 
       Policy density 0.0000  0.0002  -0.0002  
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  
Policy intensity  -0.0002  -0.0003  -0.0004 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
GDP pc -0.0748*** -0.0676*** -0.0967 -0.0827 -0.1622*** -0.1597*** 
 (0.026) (0.023) (0.063) (0.062) (0.049) (0.045) 
GDP growth -0.0026** -0.0027** -0.0029 -0.0030 -0.0041** -0.0042** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Population density -0.0008* -0.0008 -0.0024** -0.0024** -0.0005 -0.0004 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Urban population 0.0044*** 0.0044*** 0.0060 0.0060 0.0051** 0.0052** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
Industry 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0059*** 0.0051** 0.0053*** 0.0049*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Trade intensity -0.0007** -0.0007* -0.0014* -0.0013* -0.0006 -0.0005 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Manufactures exports -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0007 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Manufactures imports -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0007 0.0007 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FDI inflow 0.0004 0.0005 0.0007 0.0009 0.0002 0.0003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Lagged DV 0.8548*** 0.8533*** 0.9173*** 0.9163*** 0.8778*** 0.8734*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) 
Constant 3.0556*** 3.0211*** 1.4303* 1.3217* 2.5790*** 2.6144*** 
 (0.668) (0.647) (0.789) (0.803) (0.616) (0.571) 
R
2
 0.986 0.986 0.989 0.989 0.988 0.988 
N/Countries 632/24 632/24 632/24 632/24 632/24 632/24 
       Notes:  Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients for country fixed-effects are not reported. All independent variables lagged one 
year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
I H S — Knill; Schulze; Tosun / Measuring environmental policy change— 27 
Table 8. Determinants of air emissions, 1976-2003. Specification in first-differences. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Δ CO2 Δ CO2 Δ SO2 Δ SO2 Δ NOX Δ NOX 
       Δ Policy density -0.0003  0.0005  -0.0001  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Δ Policy intensity  -0.0004  -0.0005  -0.0004 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Δ GDP pc -0.4078*** -0.4049*** -0.3225 -0.3146 -0.4805** -0.4772** 
 (0.148) (0.148) (0.266) (0.267) (0.213) (0.213) 
Δ GDP growth 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0018 -0.0019 -0.0017 -0.0017 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Δ Population density -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0146** -0.0145** -0.0073 -0.0072 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Δ Urban population 0.0151 0.0147 0.0644*** 0.0633*** 0.0483*** 0.0477*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) 
Δ Industry -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0055 -0.0055 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Δ Trade intensity -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0007 0.0007 0.0005 0.0005 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Δ Manufactures exports 0.0005 0.0005 0.0017 0.0017 -0.0008 -0.0008 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Δ Manufactures imports -0.0007 -0.0007 0.0013 0.0013 0.0011 0.0011 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Δ FDI inflow 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Lagged DV -0.0022 -0.0014 -0.0526 -0.0505 -0.1044 -0.1047 
 (0.088) (0.088) (0.060) (0.060) (0.081) (0.081) 
Constant -0.0105* -0.0102* -0.0698*** -0.0682*** -0.0345*** -0.0338*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) 
R
2
 0.118 0.118 0.103 0.103 0.105 0.105 
N/Countries 607/24 607/24 607/24 607/24 607/24 607/24 
       Notes:  Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables lagged one year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Further to unit heterogeneity and autocorrelation, which we have dealt with in our first two 
regressions, panel analysts need to worry about nonstationarities. Particularly if the 
dependent variable is nonstationary, this usually creates an additional source of bias and 
might lead to falsely confirming relationships that are spurious. Testing for unit roots in our 
dependent variables by means of Im-Pesaran-Shin tests (results not reported), we confirm 
that our emission data are, except for CO2, indeed subject to significant trends. Since the 
inclusion of a lagged dependent variable and panel corrected standard errors alone cannot 
deal with nonstationarities, we rely moreover on a dynamic specification in first-differences 
(see Kittel & Winner 2005). Results of the first-difference models are reported in table 8. We 
do not include country-fixed-effects, because first-differencing the variables has removed 
most of the cross-country variation. 
The results of the first-difference models reveal that changes in clean air regulation do not 
remain a significant predictor of changing emission intensities. Still, with the exception of 
policy density in the case of SO2 emissions, the coefficients of our clean air policy output 
measures turn out with the expected signs. Less robust are the results for the variables 
measuring a country‘s reliance on industrial production and trade, which both turn out with 
insignificant coefficients and for the most part even with reversed signs.  
Judged by the first-difference models, the most robust predictors of emission intensities 
remain changes in GDP per capita with increases leading to lower emissions and urban 
population, where increases are associated with higher emissions. Yet, there is also some 
variation across the different pollutants under study. Per capita increases in GDP are not a 
significant predictor of SO2 emission intensities anymore while urbanization does not have a 
significant effect on CO2 emissions. These differences suggest that it may well matter for 
conclusions reached by impact data which particular pollutant is studied. 
In summary, the initial analyses in this article suggest that clean air regulations, i.e. 
environmental policy output, cannot be easily associated with environmental impacts. Put 
differently, increases in clean air policy density and intensity do not translate directly into 
decreases of emission intensities. The downside of this finding is that theories of policy 
change cannot easily be tested on the basis of environmental impact data. 
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VI.  Concluding remarks 
In this article we have developed a new measurement concept of policy change that is 
suitable to study detailed changes in public policy-making in policy fields. To this end, we 
introduced the dimensions of policy density and policy intensity. The dimension of policy 
density is composed of the policy targets and policy instruments that populate a policy field 
and thereby measures the legislative penetration and regulatory differentiation of the field. 
Policy intensity, by contrast, refers to the strictness of these measures by considering the 
concrete calibrations of policy instruments in terms of their levels and scopes of application. 
While these dimensions imply a necessary simplification with regard to the various aspects 
of policy change, they advance the state of art as they enable the systematic measurement 
and comparison of policy reforms over various policy fields or subfields, and countries with 
considerable attention to detail. 
We have illustrated the application of our measurement concept with an example from 
environmental policy research where the study and explanation of environmental impact data 
dominates the field. We focused on clean air policy as a particularly popular subfield. In a 
second step, we evaluated whether clean policy outputs can explain emission intensities of 
well-known pollutants. Such a relationship is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for 
using environmental impact data to study theories of policy change. The results of our 
analysis show that clean air regulations have no straightforward effect on emission levels of 
major air pollutants. As a consequence, we conclude that environmental impacts are not 
necessarily a reliable proxy for environmental policy change. 
This finding has several implications for future research. First, our findings underline the 
general need for a more cautious approach when measuring policy change. In particular, the 
theoretical consequences of selecting a specific measurement approach should be more 
critically reflected. In this article, we have discussed issues pertaining to environmental 
impact data such as uncertain reliability resulting from largely unknown data generation 
processes and issues of unknown lag structures. Second, and most important, the results 
suggest that a more promising way to study policy change and its theories is to rely on the 
direct measurement of policy outputs. 
That said, we should also like to emphasize that a focus on environmental impacts can still 
be a reasonable choice if the analyst is interested in testing grand theories of change at the 
macro level. After all, environmental regulations should lead to decreases in pollution if 
implemented successfully. In other words, implementation effectiveness could be the 
‗missing link‘ between policy outputs and impacts in our analyses, which we did not model. 
Yet, a certain degree of implementation effectiveness is also a necessary condition in studies 
testing policy change theories by means of environmental impact data. In this context, our 
analyses merely show that this necessary condition cannot be simply presumed. 
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In fact, a systematic investigation of the linkage between changes in policy outputs and 
changes in policy impacts could also inspire a new generation of large-n implementation 
studies. So far, however, implementation studies are typically based on small-n designs, 
given the need for a detailed assessment of certain processes and causal factors involved 
during the implementation stage, and hence serious practical restrictions regarding the 
gathering data for a larger numbers of cases. The collection of data on policy outputs and 
impacts, however, could offer a promising starting point for large-n investigations of 
implementation effectiveness. 
Finally, we would like to point out that this contribution is only an initial step to stimulate a 
more lively academic discussion about policy change in environmental policy research. Such 
a debate, while being quite advanced in social policy research (see, e.g., Pierson 2001; 
Green-Pedersen 2004; Clasen & Siegel 2007; Carsten 2011), has so far hardly taken place 
in environmental policy research. To be sure, also our approach is subject to numerous 
empirical limitations with respect to the size of the country sample and the restricted focus on 
clean air policy. Despite these limitations, however, we are confident that the direct 
measurement of governmental activity represents a step into the right direction for 
integrating the theoretical literature on policy change with large-n empirical studies. 
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